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Reasoning About Institutional Change: 
Winners, Losers and Support for Electoral Reforms 
SHAUN BOWLER AND TODD DONOVAN* 
This study assesses how the mass public reasons about political institutions by examining the effects of winning 
and losing on support for several electoral reform proposals. The national sample survey identified majorities 
supporting proposals for major changes in America's electoral institutions, and that suggested electoral osses 
may have a modest effect in reducing losers' satisfaction with how democracy works. Random assignment 
experiments that tested hypotheses derived from theories of risk perception were conducted. It was found that 
people who saw themselves as winners and losers in the electoral arena reasoned differently when proposals 
for change were framed in terms of loss. Losers may be just slightly more supportive than winners of some 
electoral reforms; however, they appeared less sensitive than winners to framing effects that presented reform 
proposals in terms of the risks of loss. Winners may support the same reform proposals but their support for 
change decreased more when the proposals were framed as a potential loss. Winners are thus risk aversive 
when evaluating electoral reform proposals, while losers may even be risk seeking. Although this survey found 
support for major reforms, the patterns of reasoning that were identified in the mass public suggest a basis for 
the stability of electoral institutions. 
The stability of electoral institutions is often explained in terms of incumbent elected 
officials' self-interest in preserving status quo rules.' Yet electoral systems do change on 
occasion in response to popular support for reforms from people who voted for the losers. 
Major changes in the Italian election system were forced on established party incumbents 
in 1993 by 'outsiders' using the referendum process.2 Likewise, support from voters 
aligned with parties out of government was a significant factor in passing a 1993 electoral 
reform referendum that changed New Zealand's voting system from first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) to Mixed Member Proportional.3 
Major electoral system change is a rather rare event, nonetheless, with the United States 
providing an example of enduring electoral rules that can produce controversial outcomes. 
America's FPTP legislative elections awarded Republicans control of a majority of seats 
elected in 2004 to both the House and Senate, although Democrats won more votes in 
House and Senate races that year. Most voters were on the losing side of three consecutive 
presidential elections prior to 2004, and the selection of Florida's decisive presidential 
electors in 2000 was particularly acrimonious. As we show in this article, proposals for 
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside; and Department of Political Science, 
Western Washington University, respectively. Equal co-authors. Earlier versions of this article were presented 
at Midwest Political Science Association meetings. The authors thank the Rice University and Texas Tech 
University political science departments for opportunities to present his research, and thank Skip Lupia and Diana 
Muntz for their efforts with the Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS). Data used in this study 
are available at http://www.experimentcentral.org/data/. Direct correspondence to T. Donovan, Department of 
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2 Mark Donovan, 'The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy', International Political Science Review, 16 (1995), 
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This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:48:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
456 BOWLER AND DONOVAN 
major electoral reforms do receive considerable public support in the United States. 
Despite all this, the fundamental processes by which Congress and the president are elected 
(single-member districts and the Electoral College) have proven to be resistant to major 
change. This phenomenon is not unique: in Britain and Canada, a majority of voters 
regularly cast ballots against the party that wins control of government while many 
proposals for reforming electoral systems languish. This suggests a bit of a paradox: if 
proposals for change are relatively popular and most voters are often on the losing side 
of major elections, why are established electoral institutions so stable? 
We study this paradox at the level of the voter by examining how electoral winners and 
losers reason about institutional change.4 The long-run resilience of representative 
democracy requires that those who lose in the electoral arena share some basic commitment 
to maintaining democratic institutions. People who support winners and losers in elections 
may see electoral institutions differently, and institutions, as North notes, are the 'rules of 
the game' that structure a society.5 Recent scholarship underscores the important 
relationships between electoral loss and attitudes about democratic institutions.6 Other 
research has made important strides in advancing our understanding of how citizens 
evaluate democratic institutions.7 Here we bridge these literatures by considering how 
responses to electoral loss and losing shape citizen reasoning about democratic institutions. 
This study is an attempt to build on our understanding of how people make choices about 
institutions, a project that Nobel-laureate Douglass North argues is perhaps the 
fundamental question we must address in order to make further progress in the social 
sciences.8 
The article is divided into three broad sections. In the first section, we discuss the 
relationship between political institutions and loss, setting out hypotheses that relate to 
citizen attitudes towards institutional change. In the second section, we present 
experimental evidence that addresses these hypotheses. We present two types of 
experiments; one where we prompt people to consider how often candidates they support 
win and lose in order to test the effects of winning and losing on their assessments of how 
well democracy works. We show that considerations of losing may have a modest effect 
on depressing satisfaction with democracy. We then present a series of experiments where 
we prompt people to consider risks associated with adopting electoral reforms. In most of 
these experiments, people who perceive themselves as electoral losers are less risk aversive 
4 Others have presented theoretical explanations of the stability of democratic institutions based on the motives 
of elites. See Adam Prezworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); 
Shepsle, 'A Comment on Institutional Change'. Our goal here is to develop an alternative if complementary 
understanding of this phenomenon based on an understanding of the mass public. 
5 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
6 Christopher J. Anderson, Andr6 Blais, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Ola Listhaug, Losers' Consent: 
Elections and Democratic Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Christopher J. Anderson and 
Christine Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy', American Political Science Review, 
91 (1997), 66-81; Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci, 'To Know It Is to Love It? Satisfaction with Democracy in 
the European Union', Comparative Political Studies, 36 (2003), 271-92. 
7 Max Kaase and Kenneth Newton, Beliefs in Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
Hans-Dieter Klingermann and Dieter Fuchs, Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Pippa 
Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
8 Douglass North, 'Nobel Laureate Lecture', Les Prix Nobel (Stockholm: Nobel Foundation, Royal Swedish 
Academy of Sciences, 1993). 
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than winners, and winners are more risk averse than losers. In the final section, we draw 
out the implications of these findings for democratic institutions more broadly. 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LOSING 
Many studies of legitimacy in democratic societies assess attitudes towards current 
institutions by examining levels of satisfaction with democracy, or trust in government.9 
Democracies may remain stable and be seen as legitimate by citizens as long as political 
minorities who lose are willing to remain committed to playing the game of electoral 
politics.10 Acceptance of the existing rules of the game may erode, however, among those 
who lose, and especially among those who lose repeatedly. Repeat losers are, furthermore, 
more likely to begin to think about changing the rules.11 Our approach to assessing support 
for changing political institutions is to see how perceptions of electoral losses affect how 
people evaluate proposals to alter electoral institutions. We seek to determine if perceptions 
of losses affect how people evaluate the way democracy works, and to assess how electoral 
winners and losers reason about changing democratic institutions. 
Satisfaction with how democracy is working is one standard measure of mass 
attachments to current electoral institutions. Another, more telling, measure of this is the 
public's willingness to change their current democratic institutions and support alternative 
arrangements. A willingness to change may be seen as a sign of how discontented people 
really are with their current institutions. One of the major questions of interest below is 
the degree to which being a 'loser' in an electoral sense pushes people into changing rules 
about how elections and representation work. We suggest that when people are presented 
with alternative institutional arrangements their choices may be informed by some level 
of self-interest: winners may be disposed towards preserving institutional rules under 
which they won, while losers may be likely to want to make new electoral rules that are 
favourable to them. Losers, wanting to become winners, may support rule changes that 
offer the promise of making them winners or giving them more influence over policy 
making.12 If ordinary citizens reason like this, we should see that losers are more likely 
than winners to support proposals for institutional change. 
This is a relatively straightforward argument to make when discussing political elites, 
and a few studies have provided evidence in its support in that context.13 The novelty here 
is in applying such an argument to the mass public, and the evidence we present below 
speaks to how well such a model of rational calculation may explain how ordinary citizens 
view political institutions. The argument can be extended to consider the different ways 
that institutional changes may be framed. Any real-world institutional change is likely to 
be quite complicated and have a number of different consequences. In presenting people 
9 Ola Listhaug, 'The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians', in Hans-Dieter Klingermann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, 
Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 261-98; Karp and Banducci, 'To Know It 
Is to Love It? Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union'; Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for 
Democratic Governance; Kaase and Newton, Beliefs in Government. 
10 Anderson and Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy'; Listhaug, 'The Dynamics 
of Trust in Politicians'. 
" William Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986). 
12 Nicholas Miller, 'Pluralism and Social Choice', American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 734-46; 
Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation. 
13 For example, Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logical of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social 
Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89. 
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with proposals for electoral system changes it is possible to emphasize some potential 
consequences over others, and to stimulate different modes of reasoning about institutions 
by changing question wording in survey experiments. One way that consequences of 
institutional changes may be framed is in terms of risks and losses. Institutions determine 
who winners and losers are, and are thus 'distributional' in nature either very often14 or 
all the time.15 Losses (or gains) that may be incurred as a result of the change are thus central 
to questions about institutional change. In our experimental setting we frame questions 
about institutional change in neutral terms or with positive language, and then contrast the 
effects of such framing with similar questions framed to present the change in terms of 
a risk or loss. 
EXPERIMENTS ON LOSING AND SUPPORT FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Our experimental design includes four conditions to consider when thinking about how 
people might respond to proposals calling for institutional reforms. These are: 
(a) current winners under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative 
arrangement where risk is not emphasized, 
(b) current losers under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative 
arrangement where risk is not emphasized, 
(c) current winners under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative 
arrangement where risk is emphasized, and 
(d) current losers under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative 
arrangement where risk is emphasized. 
We test how citizens reason about democratic institutions by offering them alternative 
versions of four electoral reform proposals, where the alternative versions frame the 
consequences of reforms differently - one version of each proposal places no emphasis 
on risk of loss, while the other version does. Our hypotheses are derived from theories of 
attitudes towards risk. Experimental psychology has demonstrated that people are more 
sensitive to the prospect of personal losses than gains in many contexts.16 Drawing from 
this, we expect that proposals for institutional change framed in terms of a risk of loss 
(conditions (c) and (d) above) will generally receive less support. However, given the 
discussion in the previous section, we also expect that losers may generally be more 
supportive of institutional change than winners. 
As the Appendix illustrates, our survey included two versions of four distinct questions 
about electoral reform to re-create conditions (a) through (d) noted above. Respondents 
to our survey were randomly assigned one of two versions of four questions about changing 
14 George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990). 
~5 Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
16 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk', 
Econometrica, 47 (1979), 263-91; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); James Andreoni, 'Warm Glow versus Cold Prickle: The Effects 
of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 
1-21; Donald Philip Green, Daniel Kahneman and Howard Kunreuther, 'How the Scope and Method of Public 
Funding Affect Willingness to Pay for Public Goods', Public Opinion Quarterly, 58 (1994), 49-67; B. J. McNeil, 
S. G. Pauker, H. C. Sox and A. Tversky, 'On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies', New England 
Journal ofMedicine, 306 (1982), 1259-62; V. Hueber, M. Neale and G. Northcraft, 'Decision Bias and Personnel 
Selection Strategies', Organizational Behavior and Human Decisions Processes, 40 (1987), 136-47. 
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electoral arrangements in the United States. The questions asked if they supported term 
limits for Congress, direct election of the president, proportional representation and a 
national referendum process. Much of the language in each version of the questions was 
identical except for how the consequences of the proposed reforms were framed. Version 
A of each question is framed with no reference to any risk of a loss and/or with the use 
of positive language suggesting the reform would 'give' voters something, produce 'more' 
of something, or yield some 'gain'. Version B of each question is framed in terms of the 
potential risk of some kind of loss, and uses negative language to frame the consequences 
(for example, that something cannot happen if the reform is adopted, that there will be less 
of something, that something will be undermined or that something will be lost). Our 
frames may thus be seen as randomly assigning subjects alternative interpretations of the 
consequences of institutional reforms. Our point is not to frame potential gains or losses 
associated with institutional change in terms of logical equivalents (as Khaneman and 
Tversky did),17 but to test how people respond to different interpretations of the 
consequences of electoral reforms. 
The literature on the psychology of choice leads us to expect that the effect of the 
negative stimulus (the risk of losses) may be different across electoral winners and losers. 
This allows us to develop some specific expectations about the patterns of responses we 
may see associated with conditions (a) through (d). Results from experiments that simulate 
monetary gambles illustrate that fear of losses leads subjects to become more risk-seeking 
in order to avoid loss.1' Those who have been losing repeatedly, moreover, become more 
willing to accept a risky bet.19 That is, at some point the default aversion to risk of losses 
may be overtaken by the effect of losing. Thus, our major question of interest is, are losers 
less risk averse than winners when reasoning about proposals for changing electoral 
institutions? Evidence affirming this question would suggest that, at some unknown point, 
there may be destabilizing effects of electoral rules that create a category of citizens who 
perceive themselves as chronic losers. Conversely, aversion to risk may well reduce 
support for institutional change. For example, it may be that concerns about risk make 
winners especially reluctant to consider changing institutions. In terms of the list of 
conditions outlined above we expect, among winners, support for change to be higher under 
condition (a) than condition (c). 
A related question considers the other major group under study - to our mind the more 
interesting one - the losers. A great deal of attention is typically paid to the winners in any 
political setting. But the losers comprise an important group because their reaction to loss 
and losing can condition the broader success or failure of the system as a whole. In this 
case, we consider whether electoral losers are less risk averse or more risk seeking when 
considering proposals to change institutions. Are losers in the electoral arena somehow less 
sensitive to risks associated with altering institutions? Winners may be especially risk 
averse. If they do well under current arrangements then when they are presented with a 
reform proposal where risks of changing the status quo are stressed, it seems reasonable 
to suppose they become less likely to support change. But is this necessarily the case for 
losers? Although we expect losers to be generally supportive of change, is this support also 
likely to decline once the risks of potential losses associated with change are stressed? 
17 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Choices, Values, and Frames', American Psychologist, 39 (1984), 
341-50. 
18 Kahneman and Tversky, 'Choices, Values, and Frames'. 
19 William J. Gehring and Adrian R. Willoughby, 'The Medial Frontal Cortex and the Rapid Processing of 
Monetary Gains and Losses', Science, 295 (2002), 2279-82. 
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A straightforward hypothesis of risk aversion would suggest that, like winners, losers are 
likely to shy away from the risks of change. Thus, support for change may be lower among 
winners in condition (c) than winners in condition (a); and lower among losers in condition 
(d) than losers in condition (b). 
However, both theory and empirical findings in the psychology literature lead us to 
expect that losers are less sensitive to risks of future losses and are thus more willing 
to gamble with institutional change. That is, we suggest that winners and losers are not 
likely to have similar responses to current institutions nor are they likely to have similar 
aversion to the risks of changing those institutions. If this is the case, support for change 
should be higher among losers exposed to the risk frame (Group C) than among winners 
exposed to the risk frame (B). Likewise, when winners consider the risk of loss associated 
with change, those considerations may have a larger effect on reducing their support for 
change than such considerations of risk have on reducing support among losers. Put 
differently, the decline in support for electoral reforms across people in (A) and (C) should 
be greater than the decline in support across people in (B) and (D). 
TABLE 1 Hypotheses about Levels of Support in Each Group 
Respondent's status 
Stimulus Electoral winner Electoral loser 
Electoral reform framed neutral or as gain A B 
Electoral reform framed as a loss C D 
Note: The hypotheses are: B > A (losers are more supportive of change); A > C (stimulus of 
risk/loss decreases support for change for winners); B > D (stimulus of risk/loss decreases 
support for change for losers), but losers are less risk averse than winners, so C > D, or 
(A - C)> (B - D) (effect of risk frame is weaker among losers than winners). 
These hypotheses about how electoral losers and winners respond to questions designed 
to simulate risks associated with changing electoral arrangements are presented 
schematically in Table 1. Our survey includes three questions designed to construct 
measures of a respondents' perceptions of their personal electoral losses that allow us to 
test whether questions framed as risky propositions elicit less support among respondents 
who perceive themselves as electoral winners than among those who perceive themselves 
as electoral losers. Here, we assume that perceptions of losing in the electoral arena over 
a time period may have consequences on attitudes about electoral rules. Our questions 
about electoral wins and losses thus ask respondents to consider whether candidates they 
supported 'in their lifetime' usually win or lose. 
EXPERIMENTS ON LOSING AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY 
Before assessing how winning and losing affect reasoning about democratic institutions, 
we need to examine how winning and losing might shape how people perceive 
democracy. We have reasons to expect that losers are likely to be less satisfied with how 
democracy works.20 Scholars have also established that measures of satisfaction with 
20 Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp, 'How Elections Change the Way Citizens View the Political System: 
Campaigns, Media Effects, and Electoral Outcomes in Comparative Perspective', British Journal of Political 
Science, 33 (2003), 443-67. 
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democracy reflect the effects of political institutions,21 short-term effects of specific 
campaign outcomes, media exposure22 and economic conditions.23 Our experimental 
design alternates the position of survey questions asking about electoral losses to test how 
considerations of electoral losses affect how satisfied citizens report being with the way 
democracy works. 
Previous studies have identified that responses to a survey question can be conditioned 
by the content of items asked prior to the question.24 One way to interpret these 'question 
order' effects is that a series of questions may shape the context in which people consider 
a later question, and trigger deeper thought about a subject than whatever ideas were 
initially at 'the top of their heads at the moment of answering'.25 We expect that a series 
of questions on losing in the electoral arena will stimulate respondents to consider their 
personal electoral losses when evaluating how well democracy works (see Appendix for 
the wording of all questions used in this study). We expect that the satisfaction with 
democracy question - measured with a survey item used frequently in the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems studies26 - will elicit less satisfaction among losers if the 
question is asked immediately after a series of questions about winning and losing. This 
experiment provides a test of whether people evaluate democracy, at least in part, on 
whether it would make them a winner or a loser. 
DATA AND RESULTS 
Our experiments were conducted as a module on a survey funded by the Timesharing 
Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS) project. The national, random-sample survey 
of 700 adults was conducted by the University of Indiana Survey Research Center in the 
autumn of 2003.27 Apart from an over-representation of women (55 per cent), the sample 
is broadly representative of the eligible American voting public: about one-third identified 
as Democrat and one-third as Republican, roughly one-fifth were under age 33 and 
21 Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis', in Pippa Norris, ed., 
Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
pp. 31-56; Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); Anderson 
and Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy'. 22 Banducci and Karp, 'How Elections Change the Way Citizens View the Political System'. 23 Harold D. Clarke, Nitish Dutt and Allan Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Polity and 
Society in Western European Democracies', Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 998-1021; Anderson and Guillory, 
'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy'. 24 Paul Abramson, Brian Silver and Barbara Anderson, 'The Effects of Question Order in Attitude Surveys', 
American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987), 900-8; George F. Bishop, Robert W. Oldendick and Alfred 
Tuchfarber, 'Political Information Processing: Question Order and Context Effects', Political Behavior, 4 (1982), 
117-200; Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, Question and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on 
Question Form, Wording, and Context (New York: Academic Press, 1981). 
25 John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, 'A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions vs. 
Revealing Preferences', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 579-616. 
26 David Brockington, 'The Paradox of Proportional Representation: The Effect of Party Systems and 
Coalitions on Electoral Participation', Political Studies, 52 (2004), 469-90; Banducci and Karp, 'How Elections 
Change the Way Citizens View the Political System'. 
27 These 700 interviews came from four survey modules having 2,015 interviews of 7,631 eligible or potentially 
eligible contact attempts (residential or personal telephone-lines). Our questions appeared first in each module; 
28 per cent of all eligible contacts and contacts of unknown eligibility responded (AAPOR RR3); 33 per cent 
refused, 11 per cent were never available and the eligibility of 26 per cent of contacts was unknown (no answer, 
always busy, etc.). If contacts of unknown eligibility are excluded, 35 per cent participated, 44 per cent refused, 
16 per cent were never available and 3 per cent were excluded due to language problems. 
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one-fifth were over 65, about half the sample had incomes below $35,000 and half had 
incomes greater than this. These respondents are randomly assigned to different categories 
of treatment in our experiments. 
The basic pattern we expect to see is that losers are more supportive of changing electoral 
arrangements, and that winners and losers reason differently about changing electoral 
arrangements. How then, might we identify winners and losers in the electoral arena? 
Existing studies of the effects of electoral losses typically depend on a single election event 
(often drawn from election study surveys) to define who winners and losers are.28 One 
potential problem with this approach is that it is difficult to distinguish the effects of a single 
electoral loss from attitudes about a specific government, or from events associated with 
a specific election. Someone may vote for a party that does not end up in government, but 
this need not mean that person regularly votes for that party, or for a party that is regularly 
excluded from government. The election study approach at measuring the effects of losses 
is thus largely unable to capture the subjective effects of perceptions of long-term electoral 
losses, or of expectations about future losses. 
We designed three questions to measure peoples' experiences with wins and losses more 
broadly. Multiple questions were needed in part because America' s separation of powers 
and federalism mean that few people will probably think of themselves as categorical losers 
in the electoral arena at any fixed point in time. Three different questions asked respondents 
to consider whether candidates they support usually win or usually lose elections. One 
asked them to reflect on all presidential elections held in their lifetime, another asked them 
to reflect on all congressional elections held in their lifetime, and a third asked them to 'look 
ahead' and consider their prospects in future local, state or national elections. Responses 
to these questions were used to assess how the effects of voters' perceptions of electoral 
losses affected their support for various electoral reform proposals. 
This approach gives us a more subject-defined measurement of losing than exists in other 
studies, which is particularly important as we expect it is memories and perceptions of 
electoral loss generally that affect behaviour, as much as actual experience supporting a 
specific losing candidate. Two disadvantages of this approach, however, are that people 
tend to develop more favourable attitudes towards winning candidates over time even if 
they voted for a loser,29 and the dynamics of interpersonal comparisons is likely to lead 
some people to desire to be winners and thus report that they are. Both factors probably 
lead to over-reporting of winners, which may mute our observed differences between 
winners' and losers' attitudes and modes of reasoning. 
The Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) survey platform allowed us to use 
an experimental design that manipulated how institutional change questions were 
presented to respondents. In particular, it allowed us to frame institutional changes in terms 
of gains or losses, allowing us to pose and test four hypotheses. We will present evidence 
addressing the first of these hypotheses via descriptive data, but Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 are 
tested with specific question-wording experiments: 
HYPOTHESIS 1 Losers will be more supportive of institutional change than winners, 
regardless of how proposals for institutional change are framed. 
28 Anderson and Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy'; Banducci and Karp, 'How 
Elections Change the Way Citizens View the Political System'. 
29 Allan J. Cigler and Russell Getter, 'Conflict Reduction in the Post-Election Period', Western Political 
Quarterly, 30 (1977), 363-76; Anderson et al., Losers' Consent. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2 Perceptions of electoral losses will affect how well people think democracy 
works. Considerations of electoral losses should make people less satisfied 
with democracy (Experiment 1 below). 
HYPOTHESIS 3 When proposals for institutional change are framed in terms of risks of loss, 
support for institutional change will be lower among all respondents. In the 
experiments below: (a) > (c) and (b) > (d). 
HYPOTHESIS 4 Losers will be less responsive than winners to the effect of framing 
proposals for institutional changes as a risk of loss. In the experiment below: 
(c) > (d); or ((a) - (c)) > ((b) - (d)). 
Despite the close nature of US elections conducted proximate to the time of our 
survey (Autumn 2003), and the fact that most Americans did not vote for the incumbent 
president or the party that controlled Congress at the time of our survey, it is noteworthy 
that relatively few respondents thought of themselves as losers when asked to consider 
elections they have participated in over the long term. Figure 1 illustrates that between 
a quarter to a third of respondents said that most of the candidates they supported 
lost in presidential and congressional elections held in their lifetime. The data also reflect 
optimism about the future: over 70 per cent expected that candidates they support 
would win 'most of the time' in future elections. Furthermore, there are relatively 
few who perceive themselves as chronic losers in the electoral arena. That is, only 7 
per cent of respondents fell into the loser category across all three questions represented 
in Figure 1, and only 22 per cent fell into the loser category on at least two of the 
three questions. In contrast, 46 per cent fell into the winner categories on three 
questions, and another 32 per cent fell into the loser category on only one of the 
three questions. 
At this point, we can only speculate about how accurately these perceptions of winning 
and losing match reality in the United States. As Wright has shown,30 survey respondents 
probably over-estimate their tendency to support winning candidates. We also expect that 
many Americans really are on the winning side of most elections they vote in, due to the 
fact that most Americans live in partisan gerrymandered US House districts where huge 
majorities vote for the congressional candidate of the dominant party in the district. Or we 
might assume that it only takes a couple of wins in any election for people to think of 
themselves as winners over the long haul. That is, people might discount losses in their 
memory, and recall instances when candidates they supported were winners. 
The important point for our analysis is that we have a group of respondents who identify 
themselves as losers in the electoral arena and who were randomly assigned different 
versions of our questions asking about institutional change. Moreover, cross tabulations 
of perceptions of winning and losing by party affiliation give evidence for the validity of 
our measures of losing: Democrats were significantly more likely than Republicans to 
report being losers in past presidential elections (x2 = 2 1, p < 0.000) and were more likely 
to expect to lose in the future (X2 = 23, p < 0.000). This is consistent with the fact that 
Democratic candidates lost four of the six presidential contests prior to the survey, and with 
Democrats losing the US House, Senate and presidential elections in the year following 
our survey. Partisan differences were not significant in responses to the question about 
congressional elections (X2 = 4,p > 0.40), which is consistent with the fact that the parties' 
30 Gerald C. Wright, 'Misreports of the Vote in the 1988 Senate Election Study', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
15 (1990), 543-63. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:48:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
464 BOWLER AND DONOVAN 
80 
70 
60 
50 
Usually win 
40 - - 
-iiiiiiiiiiiii----N- - ---Usually lose 
IWin sometimes 
30 
10 
Presidential Congressional Future 
elections elections expectations 
Fig. 1. Perceptions of electoral wins and losses in the United States 
Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research. National sample, random 
digit dial, conducted October through November 2003. 
Note: For the first two questions, respondents were asked, 'Think about the [presidential/congressional] elections 
held in your lifetime. Do you think that the [presidential/congressional] candidates you support usually win, or 
usually lose?' The third question asked, 'Looking ahead to any upcoming local, state, or national elections - how 
do you think most of the candidates you support will do?' Some respondents volunteered that they 'sometimes 
win'. N = 694 cases for the presidential question, 688 for the congressional question and 668 for expectations. 
control of the US Congress was largely balanced in the years prior to our survey.31 Again, 
we are concerned not so much about the accuracy of perceptions of losing but about how 
people who perceive themselves as losers or winners differ in how they reason about 
proposals to change institutions. 
Table 2 reports descriptive data illustrating differences in support for reform proposals 
across electoral winners and losers. It lists the percentage of respondents supporting the 
four electoral reform proposals we asked about: imposing term limits on Congress, 
establishing a national referendum process, direct election of the president and 
proportional representation (PR) for Congress. Levels of support for each proposal is listed 
for winners and losers - classified in terms of their self-reported perceptions. 
We find that a majority of electoral winners and majority of electoral losers were in 
favour of changing to direct presidential elections, imposing term limits on Congress and 
establishing provisions for a national referendum process. Majorities of losers were 
supportive of proportional representation, while majorities of winners were opposed. Our 
31 Democrats controlled the House and Senate for decades until 1995, broken by a period of Republican control 
of the Senate from 1981 to 1987. Republicans controlled both chambers from much of 1995 through 2005, with 
neither party having more than 51 per cent of Senate seats from 2001 to 2004. 
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TABLE 2 Attitudes about Electoral Reform in the United States by Respondent's 
Status as a Loser in the Electoral Arena 
Expectations about 
Usually supports Usually supports how candidates R 
presidential congressional supports will do 
candidates who: candidates who: in future: 
Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose 
Satisfied with the way 
democracy works 88% 68% 87% 75% 86% 73% 
(513) (174) (464) (220) (501) (165) 
p > 0.000 p < 0.001 p < 0.000 
Support term limits 
on Congress 74% 71% 72% 77% 73% 74% 
(505) (173) (458) (217) (494) (163) 
Support a national 
referendum process 72% 74% 72% 74% 71% 73% 
(505) (172) (455) (217) (493) (162) 
Support direct 
election of the 52% 57% 53% 53% 51% 58% 
President (507) (169) (455) (215) (498) (158) 
Support proportional 
representation for 44% 58% 46% 50% 44% 59% 
Congress (485) (160) (434) (207) (470) (158) 
p < 0.02 p < 0.001 
Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research. 
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003. 
Note: Entries are percentage agreeing strongly or very strongly with the proposal for change, 
and the percentage satisfied or very satisfied with democracy in the United States. Significance 
based on x2 tests. Values in parentheses are total number of respondents in category of 
winner/loser. 
initial expectation (see Hypothesis 1 above) was that losers would be consistently more 
supportive of proposals for institutional change, regardless of how the proposal was 
framed. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find higher support for changing US House 
elections to PR among losers (58 per cent) than winners (44 per cent). We find, however, 
that losers were just slightly more supportive of changing how the president is elected than 
winners were (57 to 52 per cent) and were only slightly more likely than winners to support 
term limits (77 to 72 per cent). The evidence in Table 2 provides some support for 
Hypothesis 1, but the results are clearly mixed. In some cases there were trivial differences 
between winners' and losers' attitudes about electoral reform proposals. Of course, these 
data in Table 2 do not account for how the risk of adopting the reforms was framed. The 
experiments reported below allow us to test whether the data in Table 2 overstate support 
for change among electoral winners and losers by testing additional hypotheses that are 
at the heart of our experimental analysis. That is, how do winners and losers' attitudes about 
these reform proposals shift when they are given other factors to consider? 
The descriptive data in Table 2 also demonstrate that losers in America, no matter how 
defined, are less satisfied with how democracy works than winners. Satisfaction with 
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democracy is 20 per cent lower among Americans who see themselves as regularly being 
on the losing side of presidential elections. In a study of Europe, Anderson et al. found 
that this inverse relationship between electoral loss and satisfaction with democracy 
existed in unitary and federal systems alike, as well as in nations with single-party or 
multi-party governments - but dissatisfaction among losers was greatest in unitary systems 
and in nations where one party formed the government.32 Despite effects that federalism 
may have on dampening the consequences of electoral loss, our data illustrate that 
perceptions of electoral loss nonetheless have substantial effects on attitudes about how 
well democracy functions in the United States. 
We are interested in how these perceptions of electoral loss affect evaluations of 
democracy and how they affect people's reasoning about changing democratic arrange- 
ments. That is, do considerations of electoral prospects weaken the mass public's 
satisfaction with democracy? Are evaluations of democracy malleable enough to be 
affected by short-term considerations of electoral loss? Do considerations of risk 
associated with institutional change affect winners and losers the same way? We turn now 
to the experiments to answer these questions. 
Do Considerations of Electoral Losses Affect How Satisfied People Are with the Way 
Democracy Works? 
We tested this by randomly assigning half of respondents the satisfaction with democracy 
question before offering them our three questions about winning and losing, and by 
assigning the other half the satisfaction item immediately after asking the three questions 
about winning and losing. Table 3 reports levels of satisfaction with democracy 
(percentage very satisfied + percentage satisfied), for electoral winners and losers 
randomly assigned to each experimental condition. Respondents are classified as winners 
and losers based on their responses to the three electoral loss questions. Those who 
responded as winners on at least two of the three questions (presidential elections, 
congressional elections and future expectations) are classified as winners. Those who 
responded as losers on at least two of the three questions are classified as losers. 
Results of this experiment reported in Table 3 illustrate that electoral losers may become 
even less satisfied with democracy when they are prompted to consider how often they lose. 
This suggests that other studies making use of secondary survey measures of losing 
(reported vote) may understate the effects of losing, as such studies do not prompt 
respondents to consider that they have lost. We also find slightly higher levels of 
satisfaction with democracy among winners if they were asked the satisfaction question 
after being prompted with questions that made them consider how often their candidates 
win or lose. We find a much larger effect among losers - there is less satisfaction with 
democracy among losers who were asked to evaluate democracy immediately after being 
prompted to consider the electoral success of their candidates. That is, 69 per cent of losers 
reported being satisfied with democracy when they were not prompted to consider whether 
candidates they support win or lose. Satisfaction with democracy among losers drops to 
62 per cent among those prompted to consider whether candidates they support usually 
win or lose. The total effect of being prompted to consider wins and losses amounts to a 
9 per cent change in levels of satisfaction: a 2.1 per cent increase in satisfaction with 
32 Anderson et al., Losers' Consent. 
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TABLE 3 Experimental Results: Consideration of Electoral Losses Erodes 
Satisfaction with Democracy among Losers 
Respondent's status 
Winner Loser Net difference 
Asked satisfaction with democracy before 
three questions about electoral losses 86.4% (272) 68.9% (89) 
Asked satisfaction with democracy after 
three questions about electoral losses 88.5% (279) 62.0% (58) 
Percentage point difference + 2.1 - 6.9 9.0% 
Big winner Loser Net difference 
Asked satisfaction with democracy before 
three questions about electoral losses 86.8% (167) 68.9% (89) 
Asked satisfaction with democracy after 
three questions about electoral losses 91.4% (163) 62.0% (58) 
Percentage point difference + 4.6 - 6.9 11.5%T 
Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research. 
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003. 
Note: Cell entries are percentage who responded that they were very satisfied or satisfied with 
democracy, with the total number of subjects per subgroup in parentheses. 'Winner' are those 
who classified themselves as winners on at least two of the three questions; losers are those 
coded as losers on at least two of the three questions used to measure losing. Big winners are 
those classified as winners on all three questions. 
Significance of differences between groups is derived from a logistic regression equation, 
where the individual's response to the satisfaction with democracy question (1 = satisfied/very 
satisfied, 0 = dissatisfied/very dissatisfied) is predicted as a function of dummy variable 
representing being a winner asked the question before the loss prompt, or a loser asked after 
the loss prompt. 
$Significant difference between winners and losers across response to risk frame (p = 0.12). 
democracy among winners, and a 6.9 per cent decline in satisfaction among losers. This 
is consistent with our initial expectation (Hypothesis 2) discussed above. Table 3 also 
compares big winners (those who never respond as a loser on our three measures) to losers. 
We find a larger increase in satisfaction among big winners who were asked to evaluate 
democracy after considering their history of wining and losing, with the total effect of the 
prompt to be 11.5 per cent when big winners are compared to losers. 
To put these results into better perspective, electoral losers have lower levels of 
satisfaction to start with, but their satisfaction erodes even further when they consider how 
well their candidates fare in elections. The winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy 
becomes quite striking when the effect of being a winner or loser is combined with the 
effect of being prompted to consider electoral wins and losses. As illustrated in Table 3, 
we see that 88.5 per cent of American winners reported being satisfied with democracy 
when asked that question after considering how well their candidates fare in elections. In 
contrast, only 62 per cent of losers reported being satisfied after considering how well their 
candidates do - a 26.5 per cent gap in levels of satisfaction with democracy. The gap is 
even larger (29.4 per cent) when big winners are compared to losers. 
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Evaluations of how well democracy works thus appear to be highly sensitive to the 
effects of winning and losing, and, on top of this, to prompts that remind people about their 
wins and losses. Considerations of wins and losses appear to have different effects for 
winners and loser; making winners more satisfied and losers less so. Our next experiments 
were designed to test whether electoral winners and losers also reason differently about 
proposals to change democratic institutions. Specifically, we test whether support for 
change is sensitive to potential risks associated with change, and whether sensitivity to 
risks of loss affects winners and losers the same way. 
Does Aversion to Risk Reduce Support for Institutional Change? Are Losers Less Risk 
Averse when Reasoning about Changing Institutions? 
The risk aversion theory discussed above led us to expect that the answers to all of these 
questions are 'Yes' (see Hypotheses 3 and 4 above). We used the CATI platform to 
structure four 2 X 2 experiments related to the questions above. The results of the first three 
are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The results of the last are reported in Table 6. In each of 
the 2 x 2's in these tables, the upper left-hand cells represent people in condition (A) from 
our hypotheses described in Table 1; people in condition (B) are represented in the upper 
right-hand cells, condition (C) in the lower left-hand cells, and condition (D) by the lower 
right-hand cells. 
These experiments were designed to advance our understanding of how citizens reason 
when considering proposals to alter democratic institutions. As noted above, respondents 
were randomly assigned a version of each of the four questions about electoral reform. The 
question wording was alternated to frame each proposal either as a loss, or as a gain 
(or neutral). For example, one version of the term limits question asked: 'Some people 
suggest that there should be term limits on members of Congress - so incumbents could 
only run for re-election three or four times. This might give new candidates a better chance 
to gain office. Would you support such a proposal?' The alternative version framed the 
proposal as a risk of loss by including the same initial sentence, but replaced the sentence 
about 'gaining office' with, 'This might mean losing some of the most experienced 
members in Congress.' Similar wording variation was used to present risky and non-risky 
versions of each proposal. 
In Table 4, winners and losers are classified in terms of their responses to the question 
about congressional elections (since the reform proposals would affect how Congress 
functions). The point of the tables is to allow comparisons of support for each institutional 
change depending on whether the proposal was presented in terms of the risk of a loss or 
not. Reading down the first column of numbers we can see if support for each proposal 
among winners shifted when it was presented as a risk of a loss. Reading down the second 
column, we see whether support for institutional change shifted when the risk of loss 
version of the proposal was presented to losers. 
Table 4 illustrates that the experimental results for winners largely match our a priori 
theoretical expectations set out in Hypothesis 3. The decline in support for change among 
winners produced by framing a proposal as a loss was statistically significant in two of three 
tests. Winners were much less supportive of the referendum proposal and the term limits 
proposal when these reforms were framed as having a risk of some loss. The risk frame 
had a negligible effect on winners' support for PR, however. In Table 5 we report results 
of the same experiments, but with winners and losers classified in terms of their future 
expectations about winning and losing. In Table 5 we see that winners' support for a 
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TABLE 4 Experimental Results: Perceptions of Electoral Loss and Risk Aversion 
Net diff. in 
Respondent's status effect of 
framing 
Stimulus Winners Losers as loss 
Term limits on Congress (framed as gain) 80.4% (235) 86.6% (112) 
Term limits on Congress (framed as loss) 63.2% (223) 66.7% (105) 
Percentage point difference - 17.2** - 19.9** -2.7% 
National referendum (framed as gain) 79.0% (220) 74.6% (122) 
National referendum (framed as loss) 65.1% (235) 73.7% (95) 
Percentage point difference - 13.9** - 0.9 14.8%* 
PR for Congress (neutral frame) 47.0% (223) 46.1% (102) 
PR for Congress (framed as loss) 46.0% (211) 54.3% (105) 
Percentage point difference - 0.9 + 8.2t 9.1%$ 
Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research. 
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003. 
Note: Cell entries are percentage who agree strongly or very strongly with the proposal for 
change, with the number of subjects per subgroup in parentheses. Losers are identified by 
responses to the question about congressional elections. 
Significance between experimental groups is derived from a logistic regression equation, where 
the individual's response to a question about institutional change (1 = strongly agree/agree, 
0 = disagree/strongly disagree) is predicted as a function of the question version (B, the risky 
version = 1, version A = 0), being a loser (1 = reports usually supporting losing congressional 
candidates, 0 = other), and an interaction term (question version B x loser), with controls for 
gender, partisanship, ideology and age. The interaction tests whether losers' sensitivity to the 
risky version of a question about institutional change is significantly different from winners'. 
*Significant difference between groups of winners and losers in response to the risk frame 
(reading across, p < 0.05). 
**Significant differences within group (reading down, p < 0.05), based on Z score calculating 
significance of difference between proportions. 
tSignificant differences within group (reading down, p < 0.12), based on Z score calculating 
significance of difference between proportions. 
tSignificant difference between winners and losers in response to risk frame (reading across, 
p = 0.11). 
national referendum process dropped 11 percentage points when the proposal was 
presented as a risk, while winners' support for term limits dropped by 20 percentage points 
when the proposal is framed as a risk. Support for each proposal was thus consistently lower 
among winners who were presented the risky version of the reform proposal. 
However, contrary to our initial expectation (Hypothesis 3), framing the proposal in 
terms of a loss did not always decrease support for institutional change among all 
respondents. Support for the PR proposal among losers (defined in terms of congressional 
elections or their future expectations) did not decline when the proposal was framed as the 
prospect of a loss. In fact, with the PR for Congress proposal, support among losers in Table 
4 and Table 5 increased significantly when they were presented with the more risky version 
of the proposal. 
Results displayed in Table 4 and Table 5 are, on balance, consistent with our expectation 
(Hypothesis 4) that losers are less sensitive to the risk of loss associated with institutional 
changes. This effect can be seen in the net difference between winners' and losers' 
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TABLE 5 Experimental Results: Expectations about Electoral Loss and Risk 
Aversion 
Net diff. in 
Respondent's status effect of 
framing 
Stimulus Winners Losers as loss 
Term limits on Congress (framed as gain) 82.5% (252) 79.6% (88) 
Term limits on Congress (framed as loss) 62.4% (242) 68.0% (75) 
Percentage point difference - 20.1** - 11.6** 8.5% 
National referendum (framed as gain) 77.2% (250) 77.6% (85) 
National referendum (framed as loss) 66.6% (243) 68.9% (77) 
Percentage point difference - 10.6** - 8.7 1.9% 
PR for Congress (neutral frame) 44.9% (245) 51.4% (72) 
PR for Congress (framed as loss) 42.2% (225) 65.1% (86) 
Percentage point difference - 2.7 + 13.7** 16.7%* 
Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research. 
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003. 
Note: Cell entries are percentages who agree strongly or very strongly with the proposal for 
change, with the total number of subjects per sub-group in parentheses. Losers are identified 
by responses to the question on their expectations about future elections. 
Significance of differences between groups is derived from a logistic regression equation, 
where the individual's response to a question about institutional change (1 = strongly 
agree/agree, 0 = disagree/strongly disagree) is predicted as a function of the question version 
(B, the risky version = 1, version A = 0), being a loser (1 = expects to lose in future, 0 = other), 
and an interaction term (question version B X loser), with controls for gender, partisanship, 
ideology and age. The interaction tests whether losers' sensitivity to the risky version of a 
question about institutional change is significantly different from winners'. 
*Significant difference between winners and losers in response to the risk frame (reading 
across, p < 0.05). 
**Significant differences within group (reading down, p < 0.05), based on Z score calculating 
significance of difference between proportions. 
tSignificant difference between winners and losers in response to risk frame (reading across, 
p = 0.14). 
responses to proposals that are framed as a risk of loss (this value is listed in the third 
column of each table). In Table 4, we find that support for a national referendum declined 
significantly more among winners in response to the framing effect than among losers 
(a net difference of 14.8 points). In Table 5, we find that winners' support for term limits 
also declined significantly more than losers' support did in response to the risk frame 
(a net difference of 8.5 points). With the PR proposal, shifts in losers' attitudes were also 
significantly less risk aversive than the shift in winners' attitudes. 
Thus, in three of the six tests reported in Tables 4 and 5, winners appear to be more risk 
aversive to electoral system change than losers. In two other tests, losers might actually 
be seen as risk seeking. We find losers more risk aversive than winners in just one of the 
six tests. In terms of our schematic hypotheses presented in Table 1, support for reforms 
among subjects in Group C was consistently lower than support among subjects in 
Group D, and in most cases (A - C)> (B - D). The effect of being a loser assigned 
the risk frame was significant in four of six experiments reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
Logit models estimating support across all respondents for a national referendum and 
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for PR find significantly higher support among congressional losers assigned the version 
of reform questions framed as a loss (with loser status and question version held constant). 
These results remain significant when age, ideology, gender and partisanship are accounted 
for. Similar models estimating support for term limits and PR find that respondents 
expecting to lose in the future who were assigned the question framed as a loss were also 
significantly more supportive of those reforms. 
Table 6 reports a final experiment designed to evaluate how winners and losers reason 
about changing electoral rules. As the Appendix illustrates, our questions about changing 
how the US president is elected were framed differently from the other three electoral 
reform proposals. Where the other experiments framed risks without making explicit 
reference to who is made better or worse off, alternative versions of our Electoral College 
question provided respondents with a cue about who might win or lose if the proposal were 
adopted.33 One version framed this cue as a potential gain: 'states with large populations 
could have more influence' if the president were elected by direct popular vote. The 
alternative version framed the cue as a potential loss: 'states with small populations could 
have less influence'. This framing is closer to the logical equals used in classic tests of risk 
aversion34 and it also allows for an experiment where respondents can be classified as 
winners or losers based on whether they would benefit or be harmed by a change in the 
status quo. Again, half of all respondents were randomly assigned the proposal framed 
either as a gain (more influence) or a loss (less influence). 
In Table 6, we once again divided our sample to classify respondents as winners 
and losers. In this analysis, subjects who lived in states with average or below-average 
numbers of Electoral College votes were classified as winners, as they benefited from 
status quo arrangements that over-represent their states in the existing presidential 
election process. These were people living in states with twelve or fewer electoral 
votes.35 We assume that losers under status quo arrangements are those living in the 
largest states (having twenty-one or more electoral votes - but far less representation per 
person).36 
Results in Table 6 are consistent with our initial expectations (see Hypotheses 3 and 4). 
Reading across the top row, we see that when the proposal to change to direct election of 
the president was framed as a gain ('large states have more influence'), there was a 
relatively small difference in support for reform between those who were winners or losers 
under the Electoral College status quo. Curiously, slightly more status quo winners (small 
33 Recall that the Electoral College over-represents states with smaller populations, at the expense of states with 
larger populations. 
34 Kahneman and Tversky, 'Prospect Theory'; Kahneman and Tversky, 'Choices, Values, and Frames'. 
35 The average state had eleven EC votes, with the median value being eight. 
36 In populous states (twenty-one EC votes or more) on average there were 600,000 people represented per EC 
vote. In smaller and median-size states (fewer than twelve EC votes), on average there were 400,000 people 
represented per EC vote. Given this mallapportionment, and that geographic dispersion of presidential campaign 
activity in states was inversely related to state population (see http://www.fairvote.org/whopicks/), we a sume it 
is valid that people in large (small) states might perceive they lose (win) under this status quo. This assumption 
may be suspect: formal game theoretic logic demonstrates hat under certain conditions voters in larger states can 
have a greater chance of playing a 'pivotal' role in presidential election outcomes. For a review, see Bernard 
Grofman and Scott L. Feld, 'Thinking about the Political Impacts of the Electoral College', Public Choice, 123 
(2005), 1-18. These formal models make assumptions about states as actors in coalition formation games that may 
not be consistent with the perceptions of actual voters. Moreover, the question was designed to prompt voters to 
consider that large (small) states would have more (less) influence under the proposed reforms, so we are able 
to test the effect of that prompt. 
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TABLE 6 Experimental Results: Risk Aversion and Reasoning about Proposals 
where Winners and Losers are Specified 
R winning under R losing under Net difference 
status quo rules status quo rules in effect of 
(R lives in average (R lives in a framing as 
Stimulus or small state) (large state) risk of loss 
Direct election of president means 
large states have more influence 
(framed as gain) 57% (166) 52% (112) 
Direct election of president means 
small states have less influence 
(framed as loss) 46% (152) 60% (150) 
Percentage point difference - 11** + 8t 19%* 
Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research. 
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003. 
Note: Cell entries are percentage who agree strongly or very strongly with the proposal for 
change, with the total number of subjects per subgroup in parentheses. Subjects are classified 
by how many Electoral College votes their state controls. Large states are those with 21 or 
more, small are those with less than 12. 
Significance between groups is determined by a logistic regression equation, where the 
individual's response to the Electoral College question (1 = strongly agree/agree, 0 = disagree/ 
strongly disagree) is predicted as a function of question version (B, the risk version = 1, version 
A = 0), residing in a large state (1 = large state, 0 = other), and an interaction term (question 
version B X large state), with controls for gender, age, ideology and partisanship. The 
interaction tests if a large state respondent's sensitivity to the risk version of the Electoral 
College question is significantly different from a small state respondent. 
*Significant difference between winners and losers response to the risk frame (reading across, 
p < 0.05). 
**Significant differences within group (reading down, p < 0.05), based on Z score calculating 
significance of difference between proportions. 
tSignificant differences within group (reading down, p < 0.10), based on Z score calculating 
significance of difference between proportions. 
state residents) favoured this change that could dilute their influence. Fifty-seven per cent 
of small state residents favoured changing to direct election when the proposal was 
framed as a gain. This compares to 52 per cent of status quo losers who supported 
the proposal when it was presented as a gain. When framed as a gain then, we see 
minor differences in levels of support across people who win or lose under existing rules 
- and it appears winners were slightly more enthusiastic about changing the rules than 
losers. 
The pattern reverses, however, when this reform proposal was framed as a loss ('small 
states have less influence'). This shift in winners' attitudes provides further evidence that 
winners and losers respond differently to risk. When direct election of the president is 
framed as a potential loss, only 46 per cent of status quo winners favoured change, a decline 
of 11 percentage points compared to winners who were presented with the alternative 
frame. Once again, we find that people who are winners under the status quo were much 
less supportive of the proposal when it was framed as a loss. Losers, in contrast, became 
more supportive when the proposed change in presidential election rules was framed as 
a loss. Whereas losers were less supportive of change even than winners when the proposal 
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was framed as gain, losers' support for changing to direct elections increased by 8 points 
(to 60 per cent) among those exposed to the risk frame. 
Thus we see again that winners are more risk averse than losers when reasoning about 
proposals to change electoral arrangements, but we also see that losers, beyond simply 
being neutral in their response to risk of loss, can be risk acceptant. The net result of this 
effect in responding to the risk framing is a substantial 19 point shift in attitudes about how 
the president should be elected: an 8 point increase in support for direct elections among 
losers associated with their response to risk, plus an 11 point decline in support for direct 
presidential elections among winners due to their response to risk. 
DISCUSSION 
Our survey found rather high levels of support for proposals to change electoral institutions 
in the United States, and we also found that people who see themselves as losers in the 
electoral arena are less satisfied with how well democracy works. At first glance this 
suggests that there may be a large constituency in the American mass public who are 
receptive to proposals to change electoral institutions. That said, we know that America' s 
national electoral institutions, like those of Britain and Canada, are quite stable historically 
and have proven to be resistant to structural change. Hence the paradox we presented at 
the start of this essay: if most voters often support losing candidates, and proposals for 
electoral system change are relatively popular, why are electoral institutions so stable? We 
can take this a bit farther: if reforms are embraced by losers and winners alike why are 
electoral institutions so stable? 
There are several possible answers to these questions, and we believe our experimental 
findings offer some insight into how the mass public may act - like elites - as a force for 
stability in political institutions. First, the framing effects displayed in our experiments 
illustrate that relatively high levels of support for institutional change found among those 
who win under status quo electoral arrangements can be quite ethereal. When winners were 
prompted to consider that a reform might come at some cost, their support for reform 
declined. This was not always the case, however, with losers. In some of these experiments, 
losers appeared relatively insensitive to risks associated with changing democratic 
institutions. At times, they accepted risk. Winners, in contrast, appear much more sensitive 
to such risks. In other words, it appears that people are able to sort out how changes in 
political institutions might make them better or worse off, and winners and losers reason 
differently with this information. When people who are doing well under status quo 
institutions realize that there is a risk of loss from institutional change, they are less 
supportive of change. When people who are doing less well under status quo institutions 
realize that there are risks of loss associated with change, their support for change may 
remain firm, or even increase. These effects are rather impressive when we consider that 
most of these proposals provided no cues about who the winners and losers would be. 
Secondly, the stability of electoral institutions may result from the fact that few 
Americans perceive themselves as consistently ending up on the losing side of most 
elections. It is possible that these perceptions are rooted in reality, at least in America. 
Given the federal nature of America' s election system, and the frequency of elections over 
time, few people may end up as chronic electoral losers. Thirdly, and related to this second 
point, people may actually vote for losing candidates quite often, yet discount most of the 
electoral losses they experience, or they may somehow place greater weight on their wins. 
This point is analogous to what psychologists refer to as the partial reinforcement effect, 
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where behaviours with satisfying consequences (winning) are strengthened and remem- 
bered even if the satisfying consequence does not occur regularly. Put differently, people 
might vote regularly (for the same type of candidates) and lose rather often. However, if 
their electoral system allows them to win at least occasionally, those wins could outweigh 
regular losses in structuring their behaviour and memory - so they may perceive 
themselves as winners. And, as we demonstrated above, support for institutional change 
can be fairly transient among people who perceive themselves as electoral winners. 
Fourthly, rules are clearly designed to insulate electoral institutions from electoral 
loser' s preferences. As North notes, institutions themselves, rather than moving inexorably 
towards efficiency, tend to evolve towards preserving the status of those who make the 
rules.37 As example, the US Constitution regulates rules about the election of the president, 
and reserves the power to adopt term limits for Congress to Congress itself. Even 
institutions that can be changed by statute (such as PR for the US House, or some form 
of a national referendum process), are regulated by the actors who won office under 
existing rules. Clearly, it is difficult to amend the Constitution or pass statutes without 
action on the part of electoral winners. Studies show these elites, not surprisingly, are less 
supportive of institutional change than their unsuccessful electoral opponents. 
Institutional changes are also inherently risky, and the uncertainty attached to changes 
makes the whole process of change more complicated than a story grounded in rational 
self-interest may allow. Not only that, the risks associated with change may also make 
change less likely. Here, however, we have found evidence that losers may not find the 
risks associated with change as motivating a reason to oppose change. Although appeal 
to the risks of change may dampen winners' support for reforms, appeals to risk may not 
dissuade losers from wanting change. If anything, losers may be willing to gamble. This 
suggests that if actual institutional reform proposals do reach the public agenda, even 
relatively sweeping proposals may be looked on with favour by losers. The difference 
between institutional stability and change may then depend upon how many people 
perceive themselves as losers. 
APPENDIX: SURVEY ITEMS 
Term Limits 
Version A: Some people suggest that there should be term limits on members of Congress - so incumbents 
could only run for re-election three or four times. This might give new candidates abetter chance to gain 
office. Would you support such a proposal? 
Version B: Some people suggest that there should be term limits on members of Congress - so incumbents 
could only run for re-election three or four times. This might mean losing some of the most experienced 
members in Congress. Would you support such a proposal? 
Yes, support No, oppose DK/refused 
Direct Democracy 
Version A: There is a proposal for a national referendum to permit voters to approve or reject some federal 
laws. An issue would be placed on the ballot if a large number of voters from around the country signed 
a petition. Would you support this proposal to give voters a direct say in making laws? 
37 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
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Version B: There is a proposal for a national referendum to permit voters to approve or reject some federal 
laws. An issue would be placed on the ballot if a large number of voters from around the country signed 
a petition. Would you support this proposal to give voters a direct say in making laws even if it would 
undermine the independent judgment of elected officials? 
Yes, support No, oppose DK/refused 
Electing the President 
Version A: When it comes to electing the President, some suggest we get rid of the Electoral College and 
simply elect the candidate who most people voted for. This would mean that states with large populations 
could have more influence over who wins. Would you support or oppose such a proposal? 
Version B: When it comes to electing the President, some suggest we get rid of the Electoral College and 
simply elect the candidate who most people voted for. This would mean that states with small populations 
could have less influence over who wins. Would you support or oppose such a proposal? 
Yes, support No, oppose DK/refused 
Election of Congress 
Version A: Some people suggest we should use proportional representation to elect Congress. This would 
probably mean that three or more parties would be represented in Congress. Would you support such a 
proposal? 
Version B: Some people suggest we should use proportional representation to elect Congress. This would 
probably mean that three or more parties would be represented in Congress, and could mean that no single 
party would form a majority. Would you support such a proposal? 
Yes, support No, oppose DK/refused 
Measures of Perceptions of Electoral Loss 
(A) Think of the presidential elections held in your lifetime. Do you think that the presidential candidates 
you support: 
Usually win Usually lose Sometimes win or sometimes lose Don't know 
(B) Think of the elections for US Congress held in your lifetime. Do you thing that the congressional 
candidates you support: 
Usually win Usually lose Sometimes win or sometimes lose Don't know 
(C) Looking ahead to any upcoming local, state, or national elections - how do you think most of the 
candidates you support will do? Do you think: 
Most of them might win Most might lose Some might win, some lose Don't know 
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Satisfaction with Democracy 
(Note: The placement of these measures of losing was rotated so that half the sample was asked them prior 
to the satisfaction with democracy item (below), and half were asked this prior to the three questions on 
losing (above).) 
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the US? Would you say very, fairly, 
not very or not at all satisfied? 
Very satisfied Fairly satisfied Not very satisfied Not at all satisfied DK/Refused 
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